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Abstract 
This paper looks inside the “black box” of the family and examines the determinants of inter vivos 
transfers in the form of allowances given to children. We consider in a simple model two main 
competing explanations for the transfer of money from parents to children in the form of regular 
allowances, namely altruism and exchange. We also extend the altruism framework to include 
unobserved child heterogeneity in monetary autonomy or the 'value of independence'. We use a 
unique dataset drawn from the British Family Expenditure Survey, which enables us to explicitly 
test both the inter-generational predictions of the various models, and through a study of siblings, 
we are also able to consider the intra-household aspects of such payments. Using both random 
(inter-household) and fixed-effect (intra-household) estimators, we find robust evidence of an n-
shape relationship between a child's external income and the receipt of allowances from parents. 
Importantly, this estimated profile does not fit the predications of simple models of altruism or 
exchange, but does fit an altruism model with unobserved heterogeneity. Further support for the 
importance of the value of independence is that girls and those with higher birth orders obtain much 
higher allowances, whereby we argue both girls and those born later mature earlier and are therefore 
likely to be causally related to a high value of independence. We believe that further investigation 
of the motives underlying intra-household transfers is important for the design of policies aimed at 
redistributing income, such as child welfare payments. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper looks inside the “black box” of the family and examines inter vivos transfers in the form 
of allowances (pocket money) given to children. The economic literature that considers intra-
household transfers has mainly concentrated on bequest motives. Here, we consider two competing 
explanations for the transfer of money from parents to children in the form of regular allowances 
(pocket money), namely altruism and exchange. In the case of altruistic motives (Becker, 1981) 
parents are assumed to derive a warm glow from the transfer of household resources to their 
children. They have others-regarding utility functions. In the exchange model (Bernheim et al., 
1985) allowances are seen as payments to children for some services they deliver to parents. 
The literature on bequests has been inconclusive regarding the motives for intra-household 
transfers. Tomes (1981) support’s the altruistic motive by showing that the size of bequests are 
inversely related to the recipient’s income. In contrast, Menchik (1980) suggests parents obey 
bequest norms. They simply divide bequests equally amongst siblings, rather than behaving in an 
altruistic manner. Bernheim et al (1985) finds evidence of bequests as an exchange mechanism 
through an analysis that quantifies child services as the frequency of visits and phone calls to 
parents by children living outside of the home. He notes that the level of these services is positively 
related to the size of the potential estate and that siblings compete with each other in this sense. 
Economists have, however, paid little attention to inter vivos transfers mostly due to a paucity of 
data with which to explore the motives for such transfers. Although Cox (1989) looks at transfers 
between family units and finds evidence mostly in favour of exchange rather than altruism. 
Data on allowances given to children provides an interesting way to re-examine these issues and 
to test the two competing motives: altruism versus exchange. The available evidence suggests that 
children begin to receive allowances, in the sense of regular transfers from other household 
members, between the age of 5 and 7 (Furnham and Thomas, 1984). Children also receive income 
from other sources outside the household, i.e. from jobs both formal and informal (perhaps even 
illegal employment), and as gifts (e.g. birthday, Christmas and holiday money). These other sources 
of income outside of the household are likely to affect the willingness of parents to transfer 
household resources to children and the willingness of children to supply services to parents in 
exchange for an allowance.  Barnet-Verzat and Wolff (2001) look at pocket money in this context 
of altruism and exchange models. Their empirical results show that a whole host of motivations are 
relevant and present these results as one explanation for why there is a lack of consensus among 
economists regarding the motives for inter vivos transfers.  
Here we contribute to the altruism versus exchange debate by analysing allowances in a unique 
data set that allows us to test both the inter-generational predictions of the models and secondly, 
through a study of siblings we are also able to consider the intra-generational aspects of such   3
payments. The analysis to date has concentrated on testing the competing hypothesis through their 
predictions regarding the inter-generational comparative statics only, neglecting the intra-
generational predictions of the models. Further investigation of the motives underlying intra-
household transfers is important as this has important policy implications for policies aimed at 
redistributing income, such as pensions and child welfare payments. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the theories of altruism and exchange, and 
highlights the comparative statics of a model that combines both explanations of parental allowance 
giving to children. The data and sample characteristics are described in Section 3, and our 
econometric modelling approaches are discussed in Section 4. The results of the statistical analysis 
are presented in Section 5, together with a theoretical framework that is consistent with out 
empirical findings. Finally, we conclude in Section 6. 
 
  2. Theoretical Background 
We will consider two existing explanations of allowances given to children by parents, altruism and 
exchange, whereby we extend the altruism model with the existence of unobserved heterogeneity. 
We first give the basic intuition for the two existing explanations, which we combine into in a 
single simple model. 
 
(i) Altruism 
The concept of interdependent utility functions has a long history. With respect to family networks 
Becker (1981) first proposed the idea that parents may receive utility from the well-being of their 
children. Thus they may be motivated to give children direct income transfers in the form of regular 
allowances. Such inter-generational transfers are aimed at bringing together the living standards of 
parents and kids. Moreover, parents may wish to equalize well-being across children in the 
household, thus using allowances to act as a form of intra-generational compensation. 
One empirical prediction from altruism is that parent would compensate children for having a 
low exogenous income of their own. Indeed, in a general dynamic model Cox (1987) shows that a 
one unit increase in parents income together with a one unit decrease in the child’s income should 
lead to a one unit increase in the transfer from the parent to the child. Altonji et al. (1997) show 
empirically this condition does not hold. They find that redistributing income in this way leads to 
only a 0.13 increase in the size of the transfer.  
 
(ii) Exchange 
Whilst altruistic motives are sufficient to explain the existence of allowances it is not necessary to 
apply altruistic motives in order to invoke other-regarding behavior. Self-interested parents may   4
give allowances as part of an implicit or explicit exchange contract where allowances are paid in 
exchange for services. These services may simply be compliance with parental regulations or 
attention given to the parent by the child. In some households children may be involved in home 
production through activities such as providing childcare for younger siblings. Moreover, this 
exchange contract may be intertemporal in nature, such as the promise to look after the parents in 
their old age, indeed if this is the service that parents purchase then one would expect to see 
allowances increase as the child gets older and therefore closer to leaving the family home.
1   
The empirical predictions of the exchange motive will hinge on the marginal value of the time 
of the child, which will determine the ‘price’ of the services, and the marginal value of the service 
of the child to the parent, which will determine the willingness to pay. It would seem likely to 
expect that children with higher exogenous income value their time more highly than others and 
that they would hence have a higher price for their services. If these services are then normal goods, 
the payment should decrease with its price. If the services are necessary goods, payment may 
increase with the child’s income. Hence the empirical prediction on the relation between allowances 
and external income from exchange would ex ante seem ambiguous. 
 
We will combine these two main arguments in a single model, adapted from Cox (1989). The 
child’s utility function is:  
 
                                                     = ( , ) C VV Y A S + ,            ( 1 )  
 
and the parent’s utility function is: 
 
                                                   ( , , ( , )) PC UU Y A S V Y A S =− + .               ( 2 )  
 
where A=allowances and  0 A≥ ,  P Y = household income,  c Y =the child’s income and S= the service 
children provided to parents such that  0 S ≥ . One should note that the income of the child and the 
parent is assumed to be exogenous. We make standard assumptions about these derivatives:  
   
                                                 
1 . See Cox (1990) and Cox and Jappelli (1990) for the full exposition of the model in an intertemporal framework 
where parents act as lending agents to credit constrained children. The predicted effects of the income variables remains 
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which means that positive but decreasing marginal utility is derived from consumption; the 
production of services is assumed to have increasing marginal utility cost for the child; and the 
parent values the utility of the child. As the leading example we have in mind, we take cross-
derivatives to be rather unimportant and the marginal utility of the services and child’s utility to be 
constant. This is for instance the case when the parent’s utility function is separable: 
 
                                 ( , , ( , )) ( ) ( , ) PC P C UY ASVY AS fY A S VY AS −+ = − + + +           (4) 
 
Now, we shall decompose the transfer of the parent to the child into an altruistic component and a 
payment for the services of the child:  0 () AAa S = + . The altruistic component is defined as the 
transfer a parent would make even in the absence of any services from the child, i.e. the 
‘unconditional payment’ to the child. This level will be determined by the first-order condition of 
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 decreases due to the concavity of the utility functions. What is easily seen is that the 
solution level of  0 A will be decreasing in  C Y  under any functional form. If the marginal value of 
money to the parent is virtually constant (i.e. parental income is much bigger than the transfer), this   6
increase is on a one-to-one basis, as in Cox (1987). In such a case,  0 A  can be written as 
 
0 0 max{0, } c AA Y =−  where   
0 A  is found by solving (6) for  C Y =0.  
Now, the part of the transfer that is a payment for services will have to take account of the 
incentive compatibility constraint of the child, i.e. the child will only supply the desired amount of 
service if the payment compensates for the loss of utility. This means there must hold: 
 
00                                                            ( , ) ( ,0) CC VY A aS VY A + +≥+                 ( 7 )  
 
Obviously, a maximizing parent will set a(S) such that this condition is indeed binding, which 
means that the implicit price of S can be found by total differentiation of (7), yielding: 
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which is a differential equation that, together with the initial condition that a(0)=0, uniquely 
identifies a(S). What is immediate is that this implicit price of extra effort is increasing in 
0 c YAa ++  and thereby in  c Y . 
What this implies for the total transfer is illustrated in the graph below for two possible 
assumptions on the type of good that S is. Under the first assumption, it is a normal good, which 
means that less is spent on it the higher the price. Under the second assumption it is a necessary 
good, which for instance arises if parent demand a fixed amount whatever its price, which would 
mean more is spent on it in total when its price goes up. 
 
   7
FIGURE 1: Allowances when there is Altruism and Exchange 
 
 
We can see the main arguments of the model in the case of our leading example: when  i
0 c YA < , 
then  i
0 c YA +  is roughly constant, and hence the price of the services is the same in the range. 
Although there can be some parental income effects which we’ve ignored here (when the parent 
gives less to the child, the parent has more to spend of its own and the marginal value of money 
decreases for the parent), these are not likely to be very important given the relatively low amounts 
of money transfers made to children. Hence, the amount of services bought in is roughly constant 
when  i
0 c YA < , which means total transfers go down linearly. When the altruistic transfer drops to 0, 
which occurs when  i
0 c YA = , the parent only transfers money as a payment for services. These will 
be declining with price (and hence with  c Y ) when services are a normal good and increasing with 
price when services are a necessity.  
 In our leading example we hence get the clear prediction that transfers should go down as a 
child’s own income increases at low levels, whilst transfers may increase or decrease at high levels 
of the child’s income, depending on the type of good that these services are. If we are only prepared 
to make the general assumptions, all that we can safely say is that the transfers should go down 
initially and will only increase with higher  c Y  when the demand for services is very price-inelastic.    8
 
(iii) Altruism and the 'Value of Independence' 
  
So far it has been implicit that there is no heterogeneity in the population with respect to utility 
functions and that the child’s external income is exogenous. These assumptions are often 
implausible as there are likely to be unobserved factors that make some children value monetary 
transfers more than others and these unobserved factors may also push up the child’s own income, 
leading to a statistical though non-causal relationship.  
To make this explicit, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the utility function of the child:  
 
                                                              (( ), , ) C VV Y A S γ = +            ( 9 )  
 
where the unobserved parameter γ has a continuous distribution over the whole population. We 
label γ as the degree to which individuals value independence. This means it is bounded between 0 
and 1. The value of independence and the external income of the child are complementary in the 










The value of independence and the external income of the child are furthermore likely to be 
statistically correlated. This argument relies on several considerations. First we recognize that the 
child’s income is itself made up largely of monetary gifts of other family members. Because there is 
a choice element to the type of transfer given to a kid, these monetary gifts are a substitute for in-
kind transfers, such as clothes or toys: it may be the case that the child requests money instead of 
other types of gifts. Similarly, a large amount of income earned by the child itself indicates that the 
child values being able to determine his or her own expenditures above relying on in-kind transfers. 
For these reasons the income of the child seems likely to be highly correlated with some wish for 
monetary independence the part of the child. Optimising behaviour of the child thus translates into a 
positive correlation between γ and  C Y . This means that the external income of the child may give 
information about the degree to which the child values his independence.  
What does this now mean for parental decision making? A maximising parent will now set the 
transfer such that marginal values are equated: 
(( ), , )
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from which we can see that, if γ were observed, parents will increase their altruistic monetary 
transfer to the child with a high γ because this increases 








. If there is a positive 
correlation between γ and  c Y , i.e. if external income conveys information about γ, this can lead to a 
spurious positive correlation between  c Y  and A in some interval (see Appendix for examples).  
There are two predictions of interest here. The first is that heterogeneity in the value of 
independence may explain some heterogeneity in transfers. We will in the empirical part check this 
prediction by looking for indicators of the value of independence. Our main indicator is the birth 
order of the child in the household because there is a lot of psychological evidence to suggest that 
the younger siblings mature faster than the older ones. 
The second prediction of this theory is that excluding indicators for the value of independence will 
bias the estimates of the effect of variables that correlate with the value of independence. Amongst 
these is arguably the external income of the child. Now, there is actually not a clear prediction as to 
the size or even direction of this bias. In the appendix we illustrate the possibilities with two 
examples within a general class. Under some assumptions on the utility function and the precise 
statistical relation between γ and  c Y , the bias is non-existent and in others the bias leads to a non-
monotonic relation between the external income of the child and the transfers to that child. 
 
3. Data and Sample Characteristics  
This analysis is based on the currently available and to our knowledge little used data on children’s 
allowances contained in the British Family Expenditure Survey (FES). The FES is a nationally 
representative cross-sectional survey that has been conducted on an annual basis since 1957. Some 
10,000 households are selected each year to take part in the FES, and the response rate is typically 
around 70%. The main aim of the survey is to provide a reliable source of information on household 
expenditure, income and other aspects of household finances. To account for seasonal differences in 
expenditure face-to-face interviews are spread evenly over the year. Each individual aged 16 or 
over in the households visited is asked to fill in an income questionnaire and to keep diary records 
of daily expenditure for two weeks. Parents are also asked to record details of children’s income 
from outside the household and the amount of pocket money they give to children. We pool across 
the two years that contain allowances and other child income data at the level of each individual 
child in the household i.e. 1998/99 and 1999/00.
 2  
Our data shows us the value of allowances that the child gets and any other monies received 
from outside the household, as well as various characteristics of the child. The children in our 
                                                 
2 The survey asked questions relating to other sources of child income for the first time in 1998/99.   10
sample are aged 0-15 years and we have a sample of 7482 children evenly distributed by age and 
living in 4055 households. By matching the children to the household we are also able to obtain a 
lot of information about the characteristics of the household. We are especially interested in the 
sibling composition of the household in order to be able to test the intra-generational predictions of 
our competing hypothesis regarding the motives for giving allowances to children.   
As well as allowances we observe monies received from outside the household. Some children 
in our sample have paid part-time jobs. Other children gain income from informal work and many 
children have income in the form of interest on child bank accounts and building society accounts. 
Children in our data set are also observed receiving income as cash gifts from people outside the 
household. The distinction between these sources of income is unimportant for our task here, our 
theoretical framework only requires that we know the total income the child generates from outside 
of the household in order to be able to test between altruism and exchange as motives for parents 
giving children allowances.  
Summary statistics of the raw data can be found in Table 1. We can see that across all the 
children in our sample 18.91% of children receive pocket money, however, this proportion 
increases with age. Indeed the proportion receiving allowances increases steadily with age from 
0.65% at age 1 to 29.26% at age 15. The size of the allowance follows a similar pattern. The 
average conditional allowance across the sample is £3.45 per week and this rises from £0.61 per 
week at age 1 to £6.07 per week by age 15. There also appears to be a gender bias, at the mean 
levels of allowances, with girls receiving a higher average level of allowance that boys (£3.69 
compared to £3.23). Britain's ethnic minorities appear less likely to receive regular allowances but 
have higher average allowances. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The relationship between allowances and the level of external income of the child appears to be 
n-shaped. Only 16.60% of children with no external income receive an allowance, where as 33.73% 
of children with an external income of £6-10 per week also receive an allowance and this trails off 
to 23.89% for those with an external income greater than £10. The average conditional allowance 
however is increasing in the level of external income. This is completely at odds with the altruistic 
explanation of allowances. The exchange motive can fit either an increasing or a decreasing 
relationship and is hence more in accordance with this initial finding.  
Regarding parental and household characteristics, we find the percentage of children receiving 
allowances and the size of the average allowances is negatively related to the number of siblings in 
the household suggesting that children with siblings compete for household resources. Regarding   11
the marital status of the child’s parents the raw data suggests that children of lone parents are more 
likely to be receiving an allowance than their two parent counterparts but they receive a lower 
conditional average amount.  Children with working mothers appear to be more likely to be in 
receipt of an allowance and to receive more. With respect to household income we can see that the 
probability of receiving an allowance and the size of the allowance is increasing in household 
income.  
Finally we consider how the level of allowances and the propensity to give an allowance 
changes with the degree of 'external' altruism that the parents show. We capture this by the size of 
regular donations to charity made by the child’s parents. We can see that children of regular charity 
givers are more likely to receive an allowance (24.48% compared to 16.99%) but the conditional 
size of the allowance is not affected. 
Figure 2 below shows the relationship between the percentage of children who receive an 
allowance and the percentage of children who have external income, by age. We can see that there 
are very few children with allowances at very young ages but there is a large increase in the number 
of children receiving an allowance after age six.  This is consistent with the available evidence that 
suggests that children begin to receive allowances in the sense of regular transfers from other 
household members, between the ages of 5 and 7 years of age (Furnham and Thomas, 1984). 
Between the ages of 0 and 6.5 years old a higher proportion of children have external income than 
have an allowance. This is reversed for children between the ages of 6.5 and 13.5 years of age. 
However after age 13.5 years old more children have an external income than receive an allowance. 
This is consistent with the fact that age 13 is the legal age at which children in Britain are legally 
allowed to have paid employment. 
   12
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4. Inter and Intra-Household Empirical Models of Child Allowances  
The focus of our empirical analysis is to model the provision of allowances given to children. The 
theoretical models outlined in Section 2 suggest that the child’s exogenous income will be a key 
factor in explaining the level of provision of allowances across children, although the descriptive 
statistics in Section 3 suggest other factors may also be important such as characteristics of the child 
and the household in which she lives. Thus our models of allowances will have the following 
general form: 
 
                                                 ( , , ) cc c c Af Z Y H =               ( 1 1 )  
 
Where  c A   is the allowance received by child c,  c Z is a set of characteristics of child c,  c Y  is the 
exogenous income of the child and  c H  is a set of household and parental characteristics.  
 
(i) Inter-Household Estimates 
As noted in Section 3 not all the children in our sample receive an allowance and so our statistical 
framework needs to account for this clustering of observations at zero. As our base model we 
therefore adopt a Tobit specification.  
We also explore the importance of unobservable household effects in determining the size of 
allowances. This statistical framework is based on a random effects specification, which allows us 
to investigate the level of correlation between allowances of children in the same household that is 
due to unobservable household effects. The panel dimension of our model arises from the fact that 
we observe each child and their siblings within the household. Given that the sampling frame of the 
FES is at the household level, we are able to create a panel of data for households. This allows us to 
control for the fact that there may be some unobservable household specific effect that means the 
children in one household may be more likely to receive an allowance than children in another 
household.   
We thus have a random effects Tobit model: 
 
*
12 3                                                       hc hc hc hc hc AX Y H ββ β ν =+ ++           ( 1 2 )  
                                                 hc h hc ν αη = +                
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where 
*
hc A  is the unobservable propensity to receive an allowance for child c in household h;  hc A  is 
the observed allowances of children in household h; X,Y and H   are vector of exogenous 
characteristics;  β 's are the associated vectors of coefficients;  h α  is the ‘household’ specific 
unobservable effect and  hc η  is a random error term. We assume a random effects specification, 
where 
2
c ~I N ( 0 , ) hc η σ , and in order to marginalise the likelihood it is assumed that, conditional on 
the covariates,  h α  are  ( )
2 , 0 α σ IN  and are independent of the  and the covariates hc η . This implies 
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Thus,  ρ  represents the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel level variance 
component. A fuller discussion of the Random Effects Probit model and the associated likelihood 
function can be found in Arulampalam (1999). The likelihood is computed using 20 point Gauss-
Hermite quadrature (see Butler and Moffitt, 1982). This model is again estimated for both the basic 
and extended regressor set in order to test the robustness of the coefficients to the inclusion of the 
external altruism variable. 
Given the richness of our data, the covariates in the basic model are: Z = age (and it's square), 
gender and ethnicity; Y = the child's amount of external income (external income is entered as a 
quadratic, following extensive tests for functional form); and H = years of education of the mother 
and father, age of the mother and father, the log of gross household weekly income, number of 
siblings in the household, lone parent, working mother, regional of residence and degree of 
urbanization of residence.  In one extended model we additionally include a variable representing 
the amount of regular charitable donations made by the adults in the household, which should 
capture the parents’ degree of external altruism towards others outside of the household; given that 
external and internal altruism might be correlated, this gives us a direct test of whether altruism may 
be involved and which variables’s coefficients change as a result of including such an indicator.  
In a second extended model we include birth order .. blab la very important… blabla picks up 
value of independence. 
 
 
(ii) Intra-Household Estimates   15
A strong assumption in the random effect model is that the unobserved household characteristics are 
unrelated to observable characteristics. This assumption can be relaxed by looking at the allocation 
of allowances within the household. In order to investigate the intra-household aspects of our 
competing hypotheses for the provision of allowances, we estimate a fixed effects model. This will 
allow us to compare differences in the levels of allowances across siblings controlling for 
observable characteristics of the siblings. In this specification we are looking at the within 
household variation in the level of allowances given to children rather than the between household 
variation that was captured in the previous models. Here we use an OLS fixed effects model, given 
the problems with the available estimators for the conditional tobit fixed effects model
3. Our final 
specification is therefore: 
 
12 3                                    hc h hc hc h hc AX Y Z α ββ β ε = ++ + +             ( 1 4 )  
 
Where  hc A  is the observed allowance of the siblings in the household, X, Y  are vectors of 
exogenous characteristics which are expected to influence  hc A  and which vary across children in the 
household;  h Z  is a vector of variables that vary across households but for each household are 
constant across the children in that household;  h α  is an idiosyncratic fixed effect which accounts 
for inter-sibling differences in unobserved explanatory variables- assuming these differences are 
constant over time and  hc ε  is a random error term. It should be noted that we cannot recover 
estimates of any explanatory variables that do not vary across the children in the household i.e. 
those contained in  h Z . However the fixed effects estimator is robust to the omission of these child-
invariant regressors. In this model the coefficient on the exogenous child’s income variable tells us 
about parent’s treatment of children within the household and thus captures intra-generational 
aspects of the provision of allowances. The fact that we can identify siblings means that our data 
uniquely allows us to investigate the intra-generational predictions of our competing hypothesis 
regarding the motives for giving allowances to children. 
By using the fixed effect method we will be able to tell whether the relationships at the population 
level are tainted by simultaneity issues at the household level. We could for instance think that 
some households have both very high unobserved savings and very rich friends. Such an 
unobserved characteristic would presumably lead us to observe both high levels of ‘exogenous’ 
income for the children (in the form of monetary gifts from rich friends) and high transfers to the 
                                                 
3 The problem is that the estimators for the fixed-effect tobit model are not proven to be consistent: there is no guarantee 
that the estimated coefficients of the procedures of (Honore, 1992) or (Honore and Kyriazidou, 2000) converge to the 
correct coefficients.   16
children from the richer parents. At the population level, this would give us a positive relationship 
between exogenous income and transfers. In the household-fixed effect analysis however, these 
unobserved household characteristics would be controlled for and the spurious relation between 
exogenous income and transfers would fall away.  
 
5. Results 
We now turn to the empirical results from our statistical models described in Section 3. The results 
are qualitatively consistent across all specifications. We will begin by considering the between 
household estimates before considering the results of the within household estimates. The parameter 
estimates for the inter-household estimators are presented in Table 2, and for the intra-household 
estimates in Table 3. We consider three models in Table 2. The basic one excludes the variable that 
captures a child’s parent’s degree of external altruism through their observed donations to charity 
and it excludes birth order. We then add both sets of variables in the two other specifications. We 
begin by discussing the key variables that allow us to draw conclusions regarding the motives for 
child allowances.   17
 
(i) Inter-Household Estimates 
Looking at the pooled tobit estimates for the extended variable set (column 2 and 3) we find that 
allowances increase with external income until external income is about 6 after which transfers 
decrease.
4 Figure 3 shows the estimated profiles between children's external income and 
allowances, for the random-effects model that includes the charity variable.  
 
FIGURE 3: The Estimated Effect of Child External Income on unconditional allowances and on 
allowances for those with positive allowances.  
 



































  note: the reference position is a 12 year old, where all other coefficients are taken as fixed. 
 
The initial increase in allowance as a response to increasing external income is inconsistent with the 
simple altruistic motivation for allowances. This initial increase could be consistent with the idea 
that parents have to pay higher amounts to receive the services of children who have other sources 
of income when these services are luxury goods. Yet, there is a level of external income at which 
this peaks and very rich children start to see the provision of allowances decrease as their income 
rises further. The exchange motivation cannot simultaneously fit this initial increase in transfers and 
                                                 
4 We have extensively tested for the best functional for child's external income. A quadratic specification leads to the 
highest log likelihood for all our models. We used a quadratic because our model suggested a possible non-linear 
relation between exogenous income and allowances.   18
the subsequent decrease. As shown in the appendix, altruism coupled with heterogeneity in the 
value of independence could explain such a non-monotonic relationship: at low levels of external 
income, the signal about the value of independence is sufficiently strong to yield a positive relation 
between the transfer and external income, whereas at high levels of external income there is no 
extra information about the value of independence and the allowance reduces. 
What directly supports the importance of the value of independence is that higher birth orders have 
highly positive and significant coefficients. We also see coefficients of other variables that 
substantially change as a result of including birth order. If we interpret this change as implying that 
these variables previously picked up part of the value of independence, those variables whose 
coefficient decreases from column 2 to 3 would have to be positively related to the value of 
independence. This would apply for having a working mother, having a lone parent, having a high 
family income, living in the city (which is the reference group for location) and being non-white. It 
would seem quite plausible that all these indeed would be positively related to a value of 
independence.  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The random effects framework allows us to establish how much of the variation in the children’s 
pocket money can be explained by unobservable household characteristics. Do some households 
actively give children allowances whilst other households have ‘preferences’ for not giving 
allowances to children? We find that the intra-household correlation is substantial, for the basic 
model ρ =0.832 with t=85.25 and for the extended model ρ =0.830 with t=84.71.
5  
As expected, allowances are found to increase with the age of the child. This result is consistent 
with the idea that older children will be more economically active and thus their consumption set 
increases. However the negative coefficient on the age squared term shows this increase is at a 
decreasing rate. The gender dummy shows that boys appear to get lower allowances than girls 
although the coefficients are only significant for the random effects model. This result is 
inconsistent with a number of recent papers that have found that parents may favour boys when 
allocating family resources. One suggested reason for boy favouring is that parents value children 
as an investment in the sense that they are able to appropriate future earnings from them (see, for 
example, Deaton, 1989). If it is the case that, direct commodity market-interactions benefit children 
through an educative process of economic socialisation, as well as through increased consumption, 
then we might expect to see a gender bias directed towards higher allowances among boys relative   19
to girls. Alternatively our result might be explained by the fact that adolescence, which is often 
argued to occur earlier for girls than boys, may be associated with economic as well as physical and 
emotional maturity in the eyes of parents. Hence gender may, quite apart from birth order with 
which gender is obviously not correlated, have a positive correlation with the value of 
independence. 
    We also control for a number of characteristics of the child’s parents. The level of education 
of the parents appears to have no significant impact on the provision of allowances to children, 
although the signs of these coefficients are consistent across the models. The age of the parents is 
positively related to the size of allowances (but is only significant in the random effects models). 
Looking at household income we find little evidence that the size of a child’s allowances are 
determined by the income of the household in which they live. This may be because parents have an 
idea about the 'right' amount of income that a child should have given their age and so it is perhaps 
not surprising that allowances are not responsive to household income. We find that children of lone 
parents receive higher allowances (at the 10% level of significance) than children in two parent 
households. This results might be surprising given that lone parent households are known to be in 
the lower income deciles, however we have already should that the level of allowances is not 
correlated with the level of income in the household. We find no impact though of the presence of a 
working mother in the household. Again though, the drop in the coefficients of these last 3 variables 
when we include birth order indicates that being a working mother, a lone parent and having higher 
family income may be positively related to a high value of independence. 
  Finally the result show that parents who are more altruistic towards people outside of the 
household in the sense that they donate more to charity are found to also give more to their children 
than parents who choose not to donate to charity. This suggests that externally altruistic parents are 
also more generous in the allowances they pass to their children.  
 
(ii) Intra-Household Estimates 
Next we will consider the intra-generational predictions of our competing hypothesis regarding the 
provision of allowances to children. Table 3 presents the results of this study, where the first 
striking aspect is that the significance of the found relationships has dropped substantially. This 
reflects the fact that there is not a lot of variation within the household to identify the underlying 
relationships with. However, taking the point estimates of the coefficients, we can see that the 
coefficients on the level of external income of the children are very similar to those of the random 
effects specification. Within households those children that have higher exogenous incomes first 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5 Our sample includes a number of single child households. To test the robustness of our intra-household correlation 
findings, we have fitted the models including only those households for which we have data on at least two children.   20
receive more and only at high levels of exogenous income do they start receiving less. This suggest 
that i) there are no very important unobserved household characteristics that are responsible for the 
results in Table 1 and 2, and ii) the simple model of altruism and exchange cannot by themselves 
explain the relations between exogenous income and transfers under any specification. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results looking at differences across siblings are also consistent with the between household 
results, i.e. allowances increase with the age of the child but at a decreasing rate. Male siblings are 
found to receive statistically significantly lower allowances than females in the same household.  
The results again strongly support the theory that the value of independence is important: those with 
higher birth orders obtain much higher transfers within the household. The inclusion of birth order 
furthermore somewhat reduces the importance of external income though not by very much. This in 
turn suggests that if external income is related to a value of independence, it is an aspect of the 
value of independence not fully captured by birth order. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have used detailed household level data to investigate the motives for parental 
giving of allowances to their children. The two main competing motives highlighted in the 
economic literature are altruism and exchange. Altruism means that parents gain a 'warm-glow' 
from the increased utility that their children deriving from the allowance, whilst exchange is 
motivated by the giving of allowances to children in order to 'buy' services from them, such as good 
behaviour. The former model predicts that parents will give the most to children who have the least 
external income, whilst the exchange model leads to ambiguous predictions. We have included to 
these standard models a third one in which we combine the existence of altruism with unobserved 
heterogeneity in the value of independence of the child. Given the richness of our data we have 
been able to explicitly test which of these models is able to fit our data. 
In all specifications we find an n-shaped relationship between external income and the transfers. 
This most clearly violates the initial arguments on altruism. Despite this, the data clearly suggests 
that altruism indeed does increase overall transfers to children and thereby that it is relevant. Our 
third model does allow for cases when this emerges, most notable when at low levels of external 
incomes an increase in this external income indicates a greater value of independence which leads 
the parent to increase its transfer to the child. This is then a statistical relationship though, not a 
causal one. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
The estimated  ρ ’s are all quantitatively similar in magnitude and significance to those presented in Tables 2.   21
As a direct measure of the value of independence we have used birth order because those born 
later in the household are likely to mature earlier. In the results we indeed find that those born later 
receive much higher transfers. Further evidence to support the idea that the value of independence is 
heterogeneous and an important predictor of transfers is the fact that girls obtain more transfers than 
boys because girls are likely to be independent sooner than boys. It finally concurs with our finding 
that parents who are more generous to charity in general not only give higher transfers on average 
but are also more responsive in their transfer to the external income of the child.
6  
. 
                                                 
6 Separate random and fixed-effect models were estimated, with the same covariates as in Tables 2 and 3, for 
observably altruistic parents and observable non-altruistic parents, where altruistic parents were defined as giving 
regularly to charity. The finding that altruistic parents display a much stronger curvature (transfers increase more 
rapidly with child’s income at low levels and only very late tail off) than non-altruistic parents is consistent across both 
the inter-household and intra-household models. These additional results are available from the authors on request.   22
TABLE 1: Who Receives Allowances, and How Much Do They Receive? 






















































Parental and Household characteristics    
























































Note: The standard error of the mean is given in parentheses. * indicates if there is a significant difference between boys and 
girls, age group relative to age=1, non-whites relative to whites, external income amount relative to no external income, number 
of siblings relative to only child, lone parent child relative to having both parents in the household, total parental income quartile 
relative to the lowest quartile, parents regularly give to charities relative to those children whose parents do no give to charity. 
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TABLE 2: Household Random Effects Models of Child Allowances 






  β   |t|  β   |t|  β   |t| 
Child Characteristics        
Age  1.984 15.57 1.989 15.41 2.187 16.50 
Age  squared  -0.075 11.17 -0.075 11.06 -0.075 11.03 
Male  -0.430 2.53 -0.435 2.53 -0.415 2.56 
Non-white  -0.690 1.34 -0.826 1.64 -1.902 4.29 
External  income  0.250 2.15 0.241 2.05 0.253 2.27 
External  income  squared  -0.020 2.55 -0.020 2.49 -0.020 2.60 
Birth Order        
Second  born  - - - -  0.728  3.92 
Third  born  - - - -  1.987  5.94 
Fourth  both  - - - -  2.922  4.75 
Fifth + born  -  -  -  -  5.240  5.08 
Parental and Household Characteristics        
Number  of  siblings  in  household  -0.765 5.54 -0.693 4.62 -0.661 5.52 
Years  of  education  (Father)  -0.078 1.44 -0.087 1.62 -0.106 2.13 
Years  of  education  (Mother)  -0.056 1.12 -0.064 1.22 -0.022 0.42 
Age  (Father)  0.061 2.83 0.055 2.34 0.042 1.87 
Age  (Mother)  0.055 2.31 0.057 2.39 0.026 1.02 
ln (Gross weekly income)  0.216  0.82  0.322  1.18  -0.109  0.49 
Lone  parent  1.618 1.89 1.661 1.89 0.112 0.12 
Working  mother  0.006 0.02 -0.019 0.04 -0.729 2.49 
Charitable donations (£'s, weekly)  -  -  0.040  3.80  0.022  2.62 
Locational Characteristics        
Region  (12)  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Urban  0.936 1.70 1.079 1.61 1.880 3.96 
Rural  0.964 1.69 1.023 1.56 1.707 2.97 
Constant  -18.96 9.87 -19.57 9.93 -17.50 9.15 
Log  likelihood  -5596  -5594  -5573  
Rho  0.832 85.25 0.830 84.71 0.847 92.48 
Sample  (in  4055  households)  7482  7482  7482  
Notes: Absolute t-statistics given in parentheses. The omitted categories are female, white, both parents in household, 
non-working mother, first born and living in a city. 
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TABLE 3: Household Fixed Effects Models of Child Allowances 




  β   |t|  β   |t| 
Child  Characteristics      
Age  0.051 2.92 0.076 3.82 
Age  squared  0.002 2.04 0.002 1.92 
Male  -0.084 2.19 -0.082 2.14 
External  income  0.024 0.91 0.020 0.58 
External income squared  -0.003  1.40  -0.002  1.32 
Birth Order      
Second born  -  -  0.050  1.02 
Third born  -  -  0.171  1.94 
Fourth both  -  -  0.321  2.34 
Fifth + born  -  -  0.582  2.88 
Constant 0.150  2.39  -0.080  0.66 
R-squared 0.060    0.063   
Rho 0.796    0.795   
Corr(u,xb) 0.112    0.061   
Observations (household units)  4055    4055   
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Appendix 1: The Relationship between Allowances (A) and Child Income ( C Y) 
We strip down our model to the relevant bare-bone relationships: 
(( ), ) C Vf YA b γ = ++ , 
                                                            P UY A V = −+                                                   (1a) 
and  C Yv γ =  
where we have taken parental income so large that we can set the marginal value of money equal at 
all ranges for the parents (all the trade-offs between the utility of the child and transfers is now in 
the function f), where services are unimportant, and where the child’s external income depends on 
the product of γ and some non-negative random variablev. We will use gγ and gν to denote the 
probability density functions of γ andv. In the first equation, b is a positive constant. 
If we take the value of independence that the parents assumes the child has equal to the expected 
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 becomes 0 at high levels of  C Y . A 
minimal set of circumstances under which this occurs is: 
                                  g (0)>0, g (1)>0, g (0)=0, lim lim g (x+m)/g (x) 0 xm γγν νν →∞ →∞ →  
which are a set of regularity conditions on the p.d.f.’s of γ and v. Under these conditions, 
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. Proofs of this are available on request, but the 
intuition is very basic: under these circumstances, when  C Y  is near 0 then all the mass of v will 
correspond to γ being very close to 0, and when  C Y  becomes very large then all the mass of v will 
correspond to γ being very close to 1.   26
This result implies that we will then indeed have a negative  / C dA dY  when  C Y  becomes large 
whilst [ | ] C EY γ  will be increasing in  C Y  for some prior range.  
 
We now show two examples to illustrate the relations we may empirically find: 
 
a)   ln( ( )) C f YA b γ =+ +  
 
In this case, the marginal utility of the child is higher with a higher value of independence and 
C Y  will indeed convey information about γ. Nevertheless, because 
2 (( ), [ | ])
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the information that  C Y  conveys about γ is irrelevant and we would have  / 1 C dA dY =− . 
 
 
b) suppose  ln(( ) ) C f YA b
γ =+ +  and  [0,1] Uni γ ∼  and 
2 ln( ) [0, ] N ν σ ∼ . 
 
In this case we have
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where Φ(.) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution. Now,  
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which displays an inverted u shape for some values of σ  and b. A graphical example where σ =0.1 
and b=0.15 is shown below. The increase or decrease in monetary transfers is likely to be 
compensated by changes in non-monetary transfers, but these are left out of the model for 
simplicity. 
  
   27
























































where we see that the expected value of independence first increases sharply and then reaches its 
maximum, leading the transfer to increase at first and then to decrease.   28
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